In 1961, this view of appeasement was upset by A.J.P. Taylor in his book The Origins of the Second World War. Taylor argued that Hitler had no plan for the war and that he behaved as any other German leader would. Appetite was an active, not passive, policy; Allowing Hitler to consolidate was a policy implemented by “men facing real problems and doing their best in the circumstances of their time.” Taylor said appeasement should be seen as a rational response to an unpredictable leader, both diplomatically and politically suited at the time. On his way back from Munich, Chamberlain told an excited crowd at Heston airport: “It is peace for our time” and he praised the agreement he had signed with Hitler. This was the culmination of the policy of appeasement. Six months later, Hitler stopped his promises and ordered his armies to invade Prague. Within a year, Britain and France were at war with Germany. The areas chosen for the referendum are not quite the same as in Godesberg`s ultimatum. For example, the industrial city and the railway node of Brno are not included. But the Germans will be so close to this city that it will be at their mercy.
In addition, it has a small German minority (about 12 per cent of the total population) who, under Hitler`s pressure, will be its true administrators. Each village or commune with a German majority (and there are many scattered in Czechoslovakia and up to the Ruthenia of the Carpathians) in regions where the Czechs are very majority, can be transformed by the instrument of the referendum into a German fortress that dominates the surrounding land like the castle of a barrel of medieval brigands. With the help of the referendum, Hitler could take control of factories, railways and strategic points. In a short time, without war and without serious resistance from Western forces, he could become the master of Czechoslovakia. During the Second World War, British Prime Minister Churchill, who opposed the agreement when it was signed, decided not to abide by the terms of the post-war agreement and to bring the Sudetenland back to post-war Czechoslovakia. On August 5, 1942, Foreign Minister Anthony Eden jan Masaryk sent the following note: the agreement was generally welcomed. French Prime Minister Daladier did not believe, as one scholar put it, that a European war was justified “to keep three million Germans under Czech sovereignty.” But the same is true for Alsace-Lorraine, unlike the alliance between France and Czechoslovakia against German aggression. Gallup Polls, in Britain, France and the United States, said the majority of the population supported the agreement.